March 22, 2005
Topics (topoi) and commonplaces
When Berkenkotter & Huckin speak of the topoi (topics), I'm not sure whether they're differentiating them from commonplaces. I rather think they are not. Following the traditions of classical rhetoric, the 1996 Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition differentiates the two; many contemporary rhetoricians, e.g., Crowley in the first edition of Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, do not. Here are definitions that may help you see the differences and commonalities between the two terms:
Topoi
"The topics were for Aristotle, as they have been for rhetoricians since, both the stuff of which arguments are made and the form of those arguments" (Lanham, Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 1991). In Methodical Memory, Crowley explains that the classical topics ("definition, similarity, difference, contraries, antecedents, consequents, contradictions, cause, effect, and comparison) were advanced by Quintilian and Cicero as "argumentative strategies that were available to any trained rhetor." Helpful details are in the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: In Aristotle's definition, topics were "strategies or principles" that enabled rhetorical invention. The sophists and Plato used topoi, but it was Aristotle who enumerated them. He differentiated common and special topics. Among the "common types of arguments" he listed "definition, parts, and cause and effect." His special topics were of two general kinds:1. "[C]ategories governing specific material appropriate as evidence in each of the types of discourse," e.g., deliberative, forensic, and epidictic topics. "These special topics did not supply information but rather prompted the rhetor to find it."The difference between common topics and special topics is that the common topics (commonplaces) are applicable to a wide variety of situations. They depend upon widely shared belief. "A stitch in time saves nine," for example, can be used to talk about U.S. foreign policy or doing one's homework. The special topics, on the other hand, were for Aristotle specific to the type of rhetorical situation. "For example, his deliberative topics included ways and means, peace and war, national defense, and food supply; forensic topics included motives, states of mind, kinds of wronged persons, and just and unjust actions. Epideictic topics pointed to virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom." Contemporary scholars are divided: some believe that Aristotle intended the topics to generate thesis and hypotheses (as did stasis theory); others think that the topics were intended to generate evidence for a thesis or hypothesis that was already decided upon (724).
2. Appeals for ethos and pathos.
Commonplaces
"A commonplace was a general argument, observation, or description a speaker could memorize for use on any number of possible occasions" (Lanham, Handlist). He's giving a fairly classical definition; here it is in contemporary terms: "A 'commonplace' . . . is a culturally or institutionally authorized concept or statement that carries with it is own necessary elaboration. We all use commonplaces to orient ourselves in the world; they provide points of reference and a set of 'prearticulated' explanations that are readily available to organize and interpret experience" (Bartholomae, "Inventing the University," 1985). Yet even while we (inevitably) use commonplaces, we have to be cautious of them: "Commonplaces have an insidious way of only fostering the dominant discourse; commonplaces are in no way revolutionary" (Vitanza, "Three Countertheses," 1991).And where does all this come from? My commonplace book, natch :)
Posted by senioritis at 09:16 AM | Comments (0)
March 10, 2005
Science ≠ positivism
In class today I sensed some uncertainty about the meaning of the word positivism (when, as I recall, I was saying that a methodology can be scientistic without being positivistic) but didn't have time to pause and discuss it. Positivism is one of those words with lots of definitions and lots of ideologies attached to it.
The definition I was working with in my remarks this morning is one from history of philosophy: logical positivism, derived from nineteenth-century Viennese empiricism (especially Augustus Comte) and associated with twentieth-century British empiricists such as Bertrand Russell and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). Logical positivism was relatively short-lived, chiefly because its object was unattainable: to step out of language in order to reveal the workings of language, so that all truth could be grounded in empirical science free of metaphysical claims. The imperfect but useful Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy offers details.
It seems to me that any larger sense of positivism has to be grounded in philosophy of science. Here are selections from my reading notes from Alan Chalmers, an antifoundationalist scientist:
The "positivist strategy" is the "attempt to define some universal, ahistorical methodology of science which specifies the standards against which putative sciences are to be judged." But these attempts, says Chalmers, are "doomed to failure" (11). The positivists want to predicate science on "protocol sentences," simple propositions that can be verified by the senses. But such propositions are revisable. "The Earth is stationary," for example, was once taken as foundational. Scientific theories, moreover, are based on scanty evidence, indeed (15).
Chalmers, Alan. Science and Its Fabrication. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1990.
(Want to really upset your undergrads? Have them read Chalmers!)
And then here are some remarks on origins of positivism in historiography:
"In the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte turned [the Enlightenment] idea of progress into a three-stage teleological view evolving toward positivism. He outlined three historical stages: [1] the theological, when all was interpreted in terms of God, [2] the metaphysical, when Christians learned to think abstractly, and [3] the positive, or scientific, when objective and precise understanding became possible" (12). "Comte's three-stage teleological view was based on the belief that the positivistic pursuit of history, the third stage, would consist of observations leading to general laws governing human activity" (17). According to the "scientific historians," "things were . . . getting better because rationality and enlightenment were thought to be increasing" (13). Comte's contemporary Henry Buckle "claimed that humans function according to patterns, instead of following free will" (12). The approach that Ranke (the source of modern history) took lent itself to positivism, too (15).
Wilson, Norman J. History in Crisis? Recent Directions in Historiography. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999.
The only source that I know of in comp/rhet that deals with positivism is one I haven't read:
Shank, Michael H., and David Vampola. "Negating Positivism: Language and the Practice of Science." The Philosophy of Discourse. Ed. Chip Sills and George H. Jensen. Vol. 1. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 1992. 22-52.
CompPile might give you more.
Posted by senioritis at 04:45 PM | Comments (1)
March 09, 2005
About composition and/or/versus rhetoric—
Check out the current issue of Enculturation.
Posted by senioritis at 12:19 AM | Comments (2)
March 08, 2005
Fleshing out écriture
Some definitions from my commonplace book; these might illuminate Conley's use of the term in his introduction to The Writing of History, pp. xx-xxi:
- From Gayatri Spivak, In Other Worlds: "It is in terms of saving the freely choosing subject whose concept insinuates itself into the most radical communalist politics of collectivity that Said uses écriture as a code word suggesting (I cannot be sure, since the word hangs unexplained on the borders of his essay) linguistic reductionism at a second remove. The thumbnail explanation of écriture as the excluded other that I have given above would have helped his general argument: 'A principle of silent exclusion operates within and at the boundaries of discourse; this has now become so internalized that fields, disciplines, and their discourses have taken on the status of immutable durability'" (123-124).
- From Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?": "The conception of écriture, as currently employed, is concerned with neither the act of writing nor the indications, as symptoms or signs within a text of an author's meaning; rather, it stands for a remarkably profound attempt to elaborate the conditions of any text, both the conditions of its spatial dispersion and its temporal deployment" (119).
- From Leon S. Roudiez, intro. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, by Julia Kristeva: The word writing "must unfortunately convey two distinct meanings as it corresponds both to écrit and to écriture (in the recent, stronger sense of the latter term). The situation is somewhat confusing in French, but worse in English. Écriture is what produces 'poetic language' or 'text'. . . . . One could possibly use the word 'scription' to convey the sense of contemporary écriture" (19).
- And from Conley's introduction to Certeau's The Writing of History: Certeau's title, L'Écriture de l'histoire, does not translate readily into English. Writing is an insufficient translation, because "écriture implies more than verbal discourse: it is a Scripture in secular garb, but it is also literature, 'writing,' in an imperiously intransitive form. Following in the steps of Freud's Moses, writing sets off in search of its own poetics. Écriture shares much with literary practice, a discipline without telos or object in sight" (xx).
- 3/29/05 addition: Certeau himself defines écriture as having "the broad meaning of the organization of signifiers" (86).
Posted by senioritis at 10:22 PM | Comments (0)
March 01, 2005
Binaries
Re Chris's comment about "damaging binaries": What are the uses of binaries, and what are the problems with them? (You can classify this as what Atrios might call an "open thread": you don't need to reference course readings as you take it up :)
Posted by senioritis at 12:35 PM | Comments (0)
February 10, 2005
Myth; fiction
In lay discourse, myth is generally a synonym for untrue. In most humanistic discourse, on the other hand, it means something more like a shared framework for making meaning, one that isn't itself subjected to critical scrutiny. In such discourse, use of the word myth isn't itself a value judgment but is a reasonably value-free descriptor.
Mythical thinking, White says, takes "signs and symbols for the things they represent" and takes metaphors literally. "When a fiction, such as a novel or a poem, is taken literally, as a report of reality rather than as a verbal structure with more or less direct reference to the world of experience, it becomes mythologized" (177).
Posted by senioritis at 08:55 AM | Comments (0)
January 27, 2005
Diataxis
"diataxis-combining the description with the argument or narrative" (contributed by Denise)
Posted by senioritis at 10:13 AM | Comments (0)
Diegesis
"diegesis-the story constructed by the narrator" (contributed by Denise)
Posted by senioritis at 10:11 AM | Comments (1)
definitions
I was lucky enough to get these from Becky last week-
diataxis-combining the description with the argument or narrative
diegesis-the story constructed by the narrator
Posted by dvaldesd at 09:53 AM | Comments (0)
terminological distress
we in the classroom have an idea/request: in comments to this entry let's define (or find white's definitions for) some of his terminology. synechdoche, metonymy, mimesis, diegesis, diataxis...
Posted by ttobryan at 09:48 AM | Comments (9)
January 15, 2005
Trope/troping/tropical (White intro)
- from Crowley, Sharon. Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. New York: MacMillan, 1994. "A trope . . . is any substitution of one word or phrase for another" (194). "Neither ancient nor modern rhetoricians have ever been able to agree about what distinguishes this class of ornament from figures" (213). There are ten standard tropes.
- from Kellner, Hans. "Hayden White." Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997.
In order to explain and describe, we interpret. In order to interpret, we search for means of persuasion. Persuasion can only be accomplished through tropes. In Metahistory, White describes a four-part theory of tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony) for historical analysis. These four tropes "describe the logically possible relationships between part and whole." - from White, Hayden. "The Real, the True, and the Figurative in the Human Sciences." Profession (1986): 15-17.
"[T]ropology is the theory of the relation between the figurative and the literalist dimensions of discourse and, as the basis of a method of inquiry, provides an instrument not only for the identification of misrepresentations in the thought of others but also for the construction of one's own discourse to the extent it is a report of facts and also—and above all—in interpretation of their meanings" (17).
Posted by senioritis at 08:44 PM | Comments (1)
Synecdoche (White intro)
- from Crowley, Sharon. Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. New York: MacMillan, 1994. In synecdoche, "rhetors substitute the part for the whole" (216).
- from Wright, Alan. "Sentence Fragments: Elements of Style, Postcolonial Edition." JAC: A Journal of Composition Theory 18.1 (1998): 91-104.
"[F]ashioning a cultural politics . . . out of bits and pieces" has potential for a synecdochal sort of resistance (95). Code-mixing, for example, resists the colonial impulse to stratify speakers of different codes (95-6).
Posted by senioritis at 08:40 PM | Comments (0)
Metaphor & metonymy (White intro)
- from Wilson, Deirdre, and Dan Sperber. "On Verbal Irony." Lingua 87 (1992): 53-76. Rpt. The Stylistics Reader: From Roman Jakobson to the Present. Ed. Jean Jacques Weber. New York: St. Martin's, 1996. 260-79. "The words metaphor and metonymy are . . . classical tropes traditionally defined as the substitution of a figurative expression for a literal or proper one. In metaphor, the substitution is based on resemblance or analogy; in metonymy, it is based on a relation or association other than that of similarity (cause and effect, place and event or institution, instrument and user, etc.)" (232).
- from Johnson, Barbara. "Metaphor, Metonymy, and Voice in Zora Neale Hurston's Their Eyes Were Watching God." Textual Analysis: Some Readers Reading. Ed. Mary Ann Caws. New York: Modern Language Association, 1986. 232-44.
Metaphor operates poetically; metonymy operates prosaically or logically. "Simile postulates the comparison: X is like Y. Metaphor synthesizes the comparison: X is Y. Metonymy is logical metaphor, in which the comparison is founded upon an actual, verifiable relation between objects or impressions: 'crown' is used instead of 'king,' 'queen' or 'royalty.' Allegory involves an extended parallel between a narrative and a subtext which mirrors the relation between the text and reality. . . . Simile, metonymy and allegory establish a balanced relationship between the use of language and conventional perceptions of reality, and occur as frequently in non-poetic discourse as in poetry" (28). - from Bradford, Richard. Stylistics. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Metonymy is "a device of symbolic substitution that replaces the subject meant with an attribute or related image."
Posted by senioritis at 08:36 PM | Comments (0)
Irony (White intro)
from Wilson, Deirdre, and Dan Sperber. "On Verbal Irony." Lingua 87 (1992): 53-76. Rpt. The Stylistics Reader: From Roman Jakobson to the Present. Ed. Jean Jacques Weber. New York: St. Martin's, 1996. 260-79.
Modern definitions of irony are predicated upon the classical understanding. "In classical rhetoric, verbal irony is a trope, and as such involves the substitution of a figurative for a literal meaning. Irony is defined as the trope in which the figurative meaning is the opposite of the literal meaning. . . . . Or, as Dr. Johnson put it, irony is 'a mode of speech in which the meaning is contrary to the words" (260). But there are "many weaknesses" in the classical definition. Irony doesn't always mean the opposite of what it says; sometimes irony is in understatement, in a recognized quotation in a particular context (261), or in an interjection. Moreover, not all statements contrary to meaning are ironic; some are simply lies (262). A second problem with the classical definition is that it identifies irony but not its motivations and reception. "We believe . . . that verbal irony is both natural and universal; that it can be expected to arise spontaneously, without having to be taught or learned" (263).
Posted by senioritis at 08:23 PM | Comments (0)
January 04, 2005
Sign, symbol, icon (White Ch. 3)
For help with White's references to Peirce's terminology in Chapter 3, I turned to the venerable first edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (hey, I can't afford the $3,000 for the second edition!):
C.S. Peirce has three types of sign:
icon: A sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own; relationship of similarity
index: A sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object; causal relationship
symbol: A sign which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such; conventional relationship
Now, the first edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy is from something like 1968, whereas the second edition just came out in the last couple of years. If anybody wants to consult that new edition, it could be very useful to us. Charles Sanders Peirce died in 1914; hence by 1968 his work had been pretty thoroughly read. But not with contemporary methodologies. I'm interested, for example, that White (p. 88), writing in 1978, seems to put Peirce's sign, symbol, and icon in a paratactic relationship, whereas the Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes Peirce's language philosophy as subordinating symbol and icon as types of signs.
Everybody who was in 651 last spring, BTW, should be consulting notes (all those beautiful summaries!) on Saussure's sign theory from that course. Saussure's and Peirce's language philosophies are hardly synonymous, but they're drinking from the same semiotic well. If anybody wants to root around in the 651 repository and post a useful summary here, there would probably be no groundswell of local objections.
Posted by senioritis at 09:57 PM | Comments (0)
January 03, 2005
History; historicism; historiography; proper history; philosophy of history (White Chs. 4-5)
In Chapter 4, White's use of terms such as proper history, historiography, history, and historicism becomes for me especially aggravating. The problem derives, I believe, from White's assumption that he is writing to an audience of experienced historians who will understand what he means by these terms, even when his meanings undergo occasional shifts. Here I'll venture my own definitions of a few of his key terms:
In Chapter 5, though, some terms that he has defined and redefined begin to come together for me:
It seems that he often uses "history," "historiography," and "proper history" interchangeably and may use "historicism" and "philosophy of history" as synonyms; but I'm not sure this is completely accurate or consistent.
Posted by senioritis at 09:13 PM | Comments (0)
December 26, 2004
"Methods" and "methodologies"
Because these two terms are used so variously (sometimes even as synonyms), I propose that we ground our discussions in the distinction offered by Sandra Harding in “Is There a Feminist Method?” Feminism and Methodology. Ed. Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987. 1-15.
Inquiry into research, Harding says, is complicated by the frequent use of method to refer to method, methodology, and epistemology.
One reason it is difficult to find a satisfactory answer to questions about a distinctive feminist method is that discussion of method (techniques for gathering evidence) and methodology (a theory and analysis of how research should proceed) have been intertwined with each other and with epistemological issues (issues about an adequate theory of knowledge or justificatory strategy) in both the traditional and feminist discourses.
As for method, Harding says that feminist researchers avail themselves of all three possibilities: listening, observing, and examining historical records. Their contribution is that they listen carefully to women's accounts of themselves, they examine social scientists' accounts of women, and they search for "newly recognized patterns in historical data." To restrict an account of feminists' contributions to the social sciences to an account of feminist methods, however, would severely minimize those contributions. But couching feminist contributions in a larger setting is problematized by social scientists' tendency to discuss methodology in terms of methods. Philosophers do the same when they ground methodological discussions in the arena of "scientific method" (2).
Objections? Alternatives? Questions?
Posted by senioritis at 08:12 AM | Comments (3)